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§5.28

Waiver by Voluntary Disclosure

Unless protected by a judicial non-waiver order under FRE 502(d), the attorney-client privilege is
waived by the client’s voluntary disclosure or consent to disclosure of any significant part of the
privileged communication or matter in a nonprivileged setting. Waiver by disclosure can occur at
any stage of a proceeding, 1 including discovery, 2 or in settings far removed from court
proceedings. 3
Disclosure that waives the privilege can be made by the client personally or by an attorney or
other agent acting on the client’s behalf. 4 Disclosure that waives the privilege can also be made by
a third party who has knowledge of the privileged matter, and waiver results if the client or his
lawyer makes no objection at the time. 5
Because the client holds the privilege, the attorney cannot waive it over the client’s objection.
The attorney has, however, some degree of implied authority to assert or waive the privilege on
the client’s behalf in the course of legal representation, 6 and the scope of such authority is
determined by the law of agency. 7 If the client fails to object to disclosure of privileged information
by the attorney, the client impliedly consents. 8 If the attorney testifies on behalf of the client, the
§5.28 1. Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Parsons, 561 F.2d 671, 674-675 (7th Cir. 1977) (grand jury testimony by house
counsel waived corporation’s privilege), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942.
2. See, e.g., Weil v. Investors/Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 23-25 (9th Cir. 1981) (disclosure by
officer-director on deposition waived privilege). On asserting the privilege during discovery, see §5.27, supra.
3. Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, 684 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (patent-owner’s
prelitigation transmission of privileged attorney opinion letter to competitor waived privilege, at least as to letter);
United States v. Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1990) (privilege waived where defendant told detective about
legal advice received from attorney).
4. United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir. 1979) (attorney-client privilege waived when attorney
disclosed information to government and client had no proof disclosure was without his consent).
5. Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191, 197 (8th Cir. 1985) (city waived claim of attorney-client privilege when mayor
voluntarily testified about privileged communications and city’s attorney did not object), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1119.
6. See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(a) (lawyer has authority to reveal confidential
information when the disclosure is “impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation”).
7. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §78, cmt. c (power of an agent to waive the privilege “is
determined under the law of agency”).
8. See United States v. Tyerman, 701 F.3d 552, 559 (8th Cir. 2012) (defendant implicitly waived privilege for
communications with counsel about location of firearm when he authorized counsel to locate and deliver firearm to

privilege is waived for communications that bear on the attorney’s testimony. 9 The client may not
assert the privilege to block discovery with respect to matters that she plans to disclose at trial. 10
Disclosure of significant part
For waiver to occur, the disclosure must reveal a significant part of the privileged
communication. 11 Waiver does not occur merely because a client discusses with others the same
facts that she earlier discussed with the attorney12 but only where she reveals the substance of the
attorney-client communications, 13 whether accurately or inaccurately. 14 A client’s statement that
she discussed the subject with her attorney does not waive the privilege for the contents or
substance of what she told her lawyer. 15
A promise to waive the privilege in the future is not itself a waiver if the privileged

prosecutor in the course of plea negotiations); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 114 F.R.D. 71, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(privilege waived in part where client encouraged lawyer to write a book about legal representation and reveal other
confidences on television program), modified, 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987).
9. In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Intl., Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (counsel for party may be deposed by
opposing party as fact witness without waiving attorney-client privilege, but privilege is waived if counsel discloses
privileged matters); Leybold-Heraeus Technologies, Inc. v. Midwest Instrument Co., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 609, 614
(E.D. Wis. 1987) (where attorney took stand, privilege waived for information necessary to cross-examine attorney).
10. Clark v. City of Munster, 115 F.R.D. 609, 615 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (if client plans to waive privilege at trial but
refuses to allow discovery on privileged matter, court has discretion to exclude privileged matter if offered at trial).
11. Proposed-but-rejected FRE 511; URE 510 (1999). See also Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 99 F.R.D. 616,
619 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (no waiver where press release summarizing findings of internal investigation did not disclose
“significant part” of report).
12. United States v. O’Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 794 (7th Cir. 1986) (in order to waive privilege, client “must disclose
the communication with the attorney itself”). See also ACN, proposed-but-rejected FRE 511 (client does not waive
attorney-client privilege “merely by disclosing a subject which he had discussed with his attorney”).
13. United States v. Davis, 583 F.3d 1081, 1090 (8th Cir. 2009) (by testifying about what attorney told him,
defendant waived privilege for what he told attorney, which was “information directly related to that which was
actually disclosed”).
14. United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 87-89 (2d Cir. 1997) (privilege waived where client gave inaccurate
extrajudicial summary of letters from attorney, claiming he approved scheme when actually he disapproved it;
disclosure of content waives privilege and so does inaccurate statement of privileged communication).
15. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 591, 603, 691 P.2d 642, 648, 208 Cal. Rptr. 886, 892 (1984) (plaintiff did
not waive privilege “through her mere acknowledgment” that she discussed certain matters with attorney).

communications are never actually disclosed. 16 But communications made with the intent that they
eventually be disclosed are usually not confidential, and no privilege arises in the first instance. 17
The party asserting waiver has the burden of producing evidence that waiver occurred. 18 The
holder is expected to rebut this evidence and has the ultimate burden of establishing that
confidentiality was maintained, because confidentiality is an element of the privilege. 19 If the
material claimed to be privileged is in the possession of a third party, the holder is expected to bear
the burden of showing that the privilege was not waived because, under the circumstances, sharing
with the third party was itself privileged. 20
“Voluntary” disclosure
The standard for evidentiary waiver is less strict than for constitutional waiver. While waiver
of constitutional guarantees affecting the fairness of a trial requires the “intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right,” 21 an evidentiary privilege can be waived by voluntary
disclosure even if the holder did not intend to relinquish the privilege. 22
Disclosure is generally involuntary if privileged matter was procured by fraud, deception, or
theft, which means that waiver does not occur. 23 Disclosure is also involuntary if it is compelled
16. Tennenbaum v. Deloitte & Touche, 77 F.3d 337, 339-341 (9th Cir. 1996).
17. See §5.13, supra.
18. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §86(3) (one seeking to establish waiver or exception “must
assert it and, if the assertion is contested, demonstrate each element of the waiver or exception”).
19. United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982) (privilege holder has burden of establishing “that
privilege was not waived”); Weil v. Investment/Indicators Research and Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir.
1981) (one of elements privilege claimant must prove “is that it has not waived the privilege”).
20. Status Time Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 95 F.R.D. 27, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (where third party was in possession
of privileged letter, burden on claimant to establish that privilege was not waived).
21. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-237, 248
(1973) (“knowing and intelligent” standard applies to constitutional guarantees necessary for fair trial; knowledge of
right to refuse a search is only one factor in determining whether consent to search is valid under Fourth
Amendment).
22. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (intent to waive privilege
“is not necessary for such waiver to occur”), cert. denied sub nom. Sea Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 444 U.S.
915.
23. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Minn. 1979)
(upholding privilege claim for stolen documents), aff’d, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980). See also proposed-butrejected FRE 512 (no waiver where disclosure occurred “without opportunity to claim the privilege”). But see
Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep v. Swiss-Bernina, 91 F.R.D. 254, 260 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (privilege lost where opponent

by court order after a privilege claim is overruled, and again waiver does not occur, 24 which means
that the holder of the privilege (or the person in possession of the privileged material) may disclose
it, and the holder can challenge the order later. If the order was erroneous, the privilege can be
reasserted in subsequent proceedings. 25
Disclosure is voluntary when made as a result of economic pressure rather than legal
compulsion. 26 Disclosure in response to a subpoena is considered voluntary if the privilege holder
produces the sought-after material without objecting. 27 If that material is obtained without the
holder’s consent during a government search, the privilege is not lost, 28 but the holder may lose
the privilege if he does not reclaim it or file a suppression motion, or take other reasonable steps
to preserve its confidentiality. 29
If a client discloses privileged matter without objection on direct or cross-examination, doing
so is a voluntary waiver unless the client was misled or confused by the question to such a degree
that that it would be unfair to find waiver. 30
found privileged correspondence in client’s dumpster).
24. See Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191, 196 (8th Cir. 1985) (no waiver where privileged matter disclosed at
deposition, because privilege objection had previously been asserted to entire line of questioning and court had
overruled objection), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119; Transamerica Computer v. International Business Machs., 573
F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978) (party does not waive privilege “for documents which he is compelled to produce”).
See also proposed-but-rejected FRE 512 and URE 510 (1999) (even though privileged matter has already been
disclosed, privilege not lost if disclosure was “compelled erroneously”).
25. See ACN, proposed-but-rejected FRE 512 (even where holder does not “exhaust all legal recourse” in contesting
order to disclose, holder may later challenge order as “erroneously compelled,” and this “modest departure from
usual principles of res judicata” is justified by fact that appeal is not always available and the advantage of having
“one simple rule, assuring at least one opportunity for judicial supervision in every case”).
26. See In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982) (privilege held waived even though client claimed
disclosure to underwriter was involuntary “because it was coerced by the legal duty of due diligence and the
millions of dollars riding on the public offering”; once disclosure is made “no matter what the economic
imperatives” privilege is lost).
27. In re Pacific Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding disclosure in response to subpoena
“voluntary” where privilege holder chose not to assert the privilege before responding).
28. United States v. De La Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (privilege can still be asserted where government
discovered letter in course of executing search warrant).
29. See, e.g., United States v. De La Jara, 973 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1992) (privilege waived where holder “did nothing
to recover the letter or protect its confidentiality during the six month interlude between its seizure and introduction
into evidence”).
30. See, e.g., Hoyas v. State, 456 So. 2d 1225, 1229 (Fla. App. 1984) (privilege waived where court found appellant
was not surprised or misled on direct examination and disclosed communication made to attorney).

Most authorities hold that waiver need not be “knowing” in the sense of awareness by the client
that disclosure would result in loss of the privilege. 31 Still, the disclosure itself must be “knowing”
or it does not amount to waiver. 32
Privileged disclosure
The privilege is not waived if disclosure is made to a person who is within the attorney-client
privilege, such as a representative of the attorney 33 or a joint client 34 or someone who asserts a
common defense. 35 Nor is the privilege lost if disclosure is made to a person having an independent
privilege, such as a spouse, physician, or psychotherapist (provided that such disclosure meets the
requirements of the independent privilege). 36
Although disclosure in a prior court hearing normally waives the privilege, 37 obviously this
principle does not mean that waiver occurs when the client or lawyer discloses privileged matter
to the court during an in camera proceeding where the whole purpose is to determine whether the
privilege applies, and the court needs assistance in ruling on the privilege claim. 38
Selective or limited disclosure

31. See, e.g., Miller v. Continental Ins. Co., 392 N.W.2d 500, 505 (Iowa 1986) (waiver found when clients disclosed
privileged communications in sworn affidavits, although they did not know such disclosure would waive privilege).
See generally 8 Wigmore, Evidence §2327 at 636 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (privilege would seldom be found
waived if holder’s “intention not to abandon could alone control”).
32. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Minn. 1979)
(privilege not waived when documents were stolen by former employee and given to government), aff’d, 629 F.2d
548 (8th Cir. 1980). See also proposed-but-rejected FRE 512 and URE 511 (1999) (no waiver where disclosure
made “without opportunity to claim the privilege”).
33. See §5.10, supra.
34. See §5.14, supra.
35. See §5.15, supra.
36. See proposed-but-rejected FRE 511 (rule of waiver by voluntary disclosure does not apply “if the disclosure is
itself a privileged communication”); URE 510 (1999) (no waiver if “disclosure itself is privileged”).
37. United States v. Suarez, 820 F.2d 1158, 1159-1160 (11th Cir. 1987) (privilege waived where defendant
permitted attorney to testify at hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea and could not be reasserted at trial to bar
attorney from testifying to same subject matter), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 987.
38. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568 (1989) (disclosing allegedly privileged materials to court for purposes
of determining merits of claim “does not have the legal effect of terminating the privilege”).

A client generally cannot make “selective” or “limited” disclosure of privileged matter to
unprivileged third persons without waiving the privilege. 39 Most authorities find waiver even when
disclosure is made to government agencies in connection with an official investigation, 40 although
a few courts have recognized a limited waiver doctrine in this context. 41 In the past, the Department
of Justice sometimes demanded waiver of the attorney-client privilege by corporations as evidence
of their good faith and cooperation in connection with government investigations. However, this
policy was harshly criticized. Under current policy, prosecutors are directed not to ask for such
waivers. 42.
Under FRE 502, which governs disclosures in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or
agency, any waiver as a result of selective disclosure is limited to the material actually disclosed,
and does not extend to additional privileged communications concerning the same subject matter
unless “they ought in fairness” be considered with the disclosed material. 43
The privilege is waived by disclosure to an adversary, 44 and by disclosure to outside auditors,45
and even by disclosure to a person paying the client’s legal fees (except where the payer is also a
client of the lawyer). 46 If disclosure to an unprivileged person was anticipated at the time of the
communication, no privilege arises because the client did not intend the communication to be
39. In re Pacific Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting theory of selective waiver); Qwest
Communications International, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006) (same); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665
F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (client cannot “pick and choose among his opponents, waiving the privilege for
some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to obstruct others”).
40. Westinghouse v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425-1427 (3d Cir. 1991) (rejecting selective
waiver doctrine; privilege is not necessary “to encourage voluntary cooperation with government investigations”).
41. United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647, 657 (8th Cir. 1990) (privilege not waived by voluntary disclosure to the
government in connection with grand jury investigation), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 821.
42. See United States Attorneys’ Manual §9-28.710 (2008).
43. See FRE 502(a). Even prior to the adoption of FRE 502, most courts followed a similar standard. See, e.g., Gray
v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1484 (8th Cir. 1996).
44. Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 538 F. Supp. 977, 980-982 (D. Del. 1982) (sending opposing party a copy
of letter from attorney to client waived privilege with respect to letter and related communications), aff’d without
opinion, 758 F.2d 668 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066.
45. United States v. M.I.T., 129 F.3d 681, 684-688 (1st Cir. 1997) (university waived attorney-client privilege by
disclosing privileged documents to government audit agency); United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138
(D.R.I. 2007) (disclosure to outside auditor waives attorney-client privilege).
46. Grand Jury Subpoena (Wine), 841 F.2d 230, 234 (8th Cir. 1988) (privilege waived when client disclosed
confidential attorney-client communications to fee payer).

confidential. 47
Nonwaiver agreements
Although the holder cannot preserve his privilege by a unilateral statement of nonwaiver at the
time of disclosing to another, 48 the holder may enter into a nondisclosure or nonwaiver agreement
with the party to whom disclosure is made. 49 Such agreements typically allow the holder to reclaim
any privileged documents produced and to assert the privilege later. Such private agreements are
enforceable between the parties, 50 and FRE 502(e) specifically recognizes this point. 51 The
difficulty, however, is that private agreements do not bind outsiders who later seek the disclosed
material, and these outsiders can argue that disclosure waived the privilege. 52
FRE 502(d) addresses this issue by authorizing courts to enter protective orders that will prevent
waiver of privilege even where disclosure to an unprivileged third party is made intentionally or
without taking “reasonable steps” to prevent disclosure. As the ACN states, such a court order may
provide for “return of documents without waiver irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing
party” and contemplates use of “claw-back” and “quick peek” arrangements “as a way to avoid
the excessive costs of pre-production review.” 53
Effect of agreements and pretrial orders
47. See §5.13, supra. See also United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072-1073 (4th Cir. 1982) (privilege as to
legal opinions waived when clients publicized portions in brochures; court questions whether privilege ever
attached, given intent for future disclosure).
48. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 99 F.R.D. 582, 584-586 (D.D.C. 1983) (disclosing party waived privilege even
though it stated in transmittal letter to SEC that it did not waive privilege by submission of information), aff’d, 738
F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
49. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (SEC or other government agency “could expressly agree
to any limit on disclosure to other agencies consistent with their responsibilities under law”).
50. Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National Bank, 103 F.R.D. 52, 67-68 (D.D.C. 1984) (agreement is contract
between parties “to refrain from raising the issue of waiver” or “otherwise utilizing” information).
51. See FRE 502(e).
52. See FRE 502(e) (agreement on effect of disclosure in federal proceeding is “binding only on the parties to the
agreement, unless it is incorporated into a court order”). See also United States v. M.I.T., 129 F.3d 681, 684-688 (1st
Cir. 1997) (nondisclosure agreement with government audit agency not binding on nonparties such as IRS).
53. ACN to FRE 502. A “claw back” provision generally allows a party to recover inadvertently disclosed material
from an opponent without a finding of waiver. A “quick peek” arrangement allows a party to disclose material
without waiver prior to any privilege review, with a later privilege review of any material designated by the
opponent for copying.

Such a “nonwaiver” order of the court is binding not only in the proceeding where it was
entered, but in “any other federal or state proceeding.” Thus this federal limitation on privilege
waiver prevails over any state law to the contrary, which is one reason why it was necessary for
this provision to be enacted by Congress. 54 With respect to disclosures of privileged material that
occur in state proceedings, Rule 502 adopts the position that the waiver provision—state or
federal—that is most protective of the privilege should control in determining the effect of that
disclosure in a subsequent federal proceeding. 55
Writings used to refresh recollection
Difficult waiver questions arise when privileged documents are used to refresh the recollection
of a witness for the purpose of testifying. FRE 612 provides that writings so used by a witness at
trial are required to be produced at the request of an adverse party, and if the writings are used to
refresh recollection before trial the court has discretion to order production. If the witness is outside
the circle of persons who may receive the communication without destroying confidentiality, 56 it
is unnecessary to consider the effect of FRE 612, because the privilege is lost under traditional
principles of waiver. But if she is within the circle (perhaps a client or representative of a client or
expert assisting counsel in trial preparation), the question arises whether FRE 612 overrides the
privilege so production of the writing may be ordered. 57
Courts are divided on the question whether (or the degree to which) an attorney’s use of work
product or privileged material in preparing experts to testify has the effect of waiving protections
of the work product doctrine or attorney-client privilege. Some courts hold that FRE 612, which
says a court may order disclosure of written material reviewed by a witness before testifying,
includes authority to overrule claims of privilege or work product, 58 and the underlying policy
54. FRE 502 was enacted by Congress in 2008 as Senate Bill 2450 and signed by the president on September 19,
2008. It applies “in all proceedings commenced after the date of enactment of this Act and, insofar as is just and
practicable, in all proceedings pending on such date of enactment.” (Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3537).
55. See FRE 502(c).
56. See §5.13, supra.
57. Although the House Judiciary Committee stated its intent “that nothing in the Rule be construed as barring the
assertion of a privilege with respect to writings used by a witness to refresh his memory,” the Committee also
viewed FRE 612 as consistent with “existing federal law.” House Report, at 13. Under preexisting federal law, a
privileged document used to refresh a witness’s recollection during his testimony was subject to production. See,
e.g., Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. Ill. 1972). There is no indication that the Committee
intended a different rule to apply to writings used to refresh prior to testifying. See Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corp. v.
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (“If the paramount purpose of federal discovery
rules is the ascertainment of the truth, the fact that a document was used to refresh one’s recollection prior to his
testimony instead of during his testimony is of little significance.”).
58. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States Postal Serv., 88 F.R.D. 348, 350 (D.D.C. 1980) (FRE 612 authorizes a
finding of waiver when privileged documents are used to refresh witness’s recollection).

behind these holdings is that it is unfair to let a witness rely on writings or conversations with
counsel that are beyond reach of discovery or protected from inquiry on cross-examination of the
expert. 59 Some courts have concluded that FRE 612 allows them even to require pretrial production
of privileged writings reviewed by the witness before testifying. 60
Other courts are more cautious, and the underlying policy is that opening up conversations with
the lawyer for the calling party, and exposing materials covered by work product or attorney-client
privilege, drive lawyers away from using written material and toward reliance on oral briefings,
force lawyers to hire experts who never testify, and lead to disclosure going beyond the actual
basis of any testimony ultimately offered. Courts taking this view ask whether production is
“necessary in the interests of justice” 61 or require the other side to show that the witness actually
did rely on a particular writing in refreshing his memory or in formulating his testimony. 62 Of
course showing reliance can be hard if a witness is uncooperative or untruthful, and it seems that
a witness should not be able to block production simply by denying that he relied on something,
particularly if he spent a lot of time reviewing it or if his testimony reflects detailed information
that he could not readily have memorized or gotten somewhere else. Before ordering production,
some courts undertake in camera review to determine the extent of reliance, if any, on documents

59. See Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (accepting plaintiff’s claim would ignore
“unfair disadvantage” that could be placed on the cross-examiner “by the simple expedient of using only privileged
writings to refresh recollection”). But see Davidson & Voth, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 64 Or. L. Rev.
637, 666 (1986) (criticizing cases requiring production of privileged writings used to refresh, because allowing
witnesses to review prior statements “is hardly a means to influence testimony improperly”; moreover, production
can be easily evaded by briefing witnesses orally, a method that may have a greater danger of improperly
influencing the witness’s testimony).
60. James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144-146 (D. Del. 1982) (when counsel made decision to
“educate” witness with protected work product, opponent is entitled “to know the content of that education”);
Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (use of documents
to refresh memory prior to deposition effectively waived attorney-client privilege).
61. See, e.g., Baker v. CNA Ins. Co., 123 F.R.D. 322, 327 (D. Mont. 1988) (no waiver from disclosure for purposes
of refreshment unless testimony discloses significant portion of privileged material). See generally Floyd, A
“Delicate and Difficult Task”: Balancing the Competing Interests of Federal Rule of Evidence 612, the Work
Product Doctrine, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 101 (1996).
62. Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 318 (3d Cir. 1985) (party cannot seek production of refreshment material without
first asking questions at deposition and showing that testimony related to documents used to refresh), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 903. See also In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 796 F.3d 137, 144-145 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (granting writ of
mandamus to block order to produce privileged corporate internal investigation materials under FRE 612, where
party conducting deposition had directed corporate representative to be prepared on topic of internal investigation
and then claimed right to see privileged material that was reviewed in preparation for deposition;
“[a]llowing privilege and protection to be so easily defeated would defy ‘reason and experience,’ and potentially
upend certain settled understandings and practices about the protections for such investigations”).

and conversations with counsel. 63 If privilege or work product protection is lost, any waiver applies
only to documents and other material actually considered, not to other things. 64
Scope of waiver
If a client discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of a communication, the
traditional rule has been that the privilege is waived not only for the matter disclosed but for all
other related communications. 65 The rationale for this “part-whole” rule of waiver is that a litigant
should not be allowed to make partial disclosure of a privileged communication 66 because the part
disclosed might be unrepresentative, misleading to the opponent or trier of fact, or unduly
favorable to the disclosing party. 67
FRE 502(a) rejects this view and provides that waiver extends to undisclosed communications
relating to the same subject matter only where “they ought in fairness to be considered together.”68
Courts are most likely to rule that partial disclosure results in broad waiver when it is made to a
63. Barrer v. Women’s Natl. Bank, 96 F.R.D. 202, 205 (D.D.C. 1982) (court resolved conflict between FRE 612 and
attorney-client privilege by undertaking in camera review of documents to determine whether there was discrepancy
between testimony and documents used to refresh).
64. Marshall v. United States Postal Serv., 88 F.R.D. 348, 351 (D.D.C. 1980) (using a document to aid recollection
“requires only the disclosure of the document to opposing counsel” and disclosure does not “constitute any further
waiver of the attorney-client privilege”).
65. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (voluntary disclosure of privileged document to
third party waives the privilege not only for document but “all the communications relating to the same subject
matter”); Appleton Papers, Inc. v. E.P.A., 702 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting general rule that a party
voluntarily disclosing part of a privileged conversation “waives the privilege as to the portion disclosed and to all
other communications relating to the same subject matter”).
66. 8 Wigmore, Evidence §2327, at 638 (attorney-client privilege is “intended only as an incidental means of
defense, and not as an independent means of attack”).
67. Patrick v. City of Chicago, 154 F. Supp. 3d 705, 715-716 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (declining to apply subject matter
waiver because “subject matter waiver generally occurs only where the party holding the privilege seeks to gain
some strategic advantage by disclosing favorable, privileged information, while holding back that which is
unfavorable”); International Paper Co. v. Fiberboard Corp., 63 F.R.D. 88, 92 (D. Del. 1974) (it would be “manifestly
unfair” to allow one party to make factual assertions and then deny the other party “the foundation for those
assertions in order to contradict them”). A factor to be considered is how intertwined the disclosed communication is
with other communications necessary to present a balanced account. Cf. FRE 106, discussed in §§1.17-1.18, supra.
68. ACN to FRE 502(a) (subject matter waiver “is limited to situations in which a party intentionally puts protected
information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and unfair manner”). See also Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Kilpatrick,
Townsend & Stockton LLP, 684 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that FRE 502(a) “limited the effect of
waiver by strongly endorsing fairness balancing”).

trier of fact who could be misled by a privileged communication taken out of context 69 or when a
party tries to gain some advantage by partial disclosure. 70 If a party makes partial disclosure of
privileged matter prior to trial, this tactic could be unfair if it interferes with the opponent’s ability
to prepare for trial or distorts settlement expectations. 71 Although FRE 502(a) does not apply to
prelitigation disclosures that were not made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency,
federal courts apply similar fairness principles as a matter of federal common law in assessing the
effect of such disclosures. 72.
Once the attorney-client privilege is waived, it generally cannot be reasserted. 73 If disclosure
occurs without waiver, however, as happens when a court compels disclosure erroneously, the
holder can assert the privilege to bar introduction of the evidence in a later proceeding. 74 Similarly,
even though theft, interception, or breach of confidentiality by the attorney can destroy the secrecy
of the communication, the privilege itself is not necessarily lost (if proper precautions were taken)
and may be asserted at a subsequent proceeding. 75
69. See, e.g., ITT Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 185-186 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (once litigant introduces part of
correspondence with attorney, production of all related correspondence may be required).
70. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (when party reveals part of privileged
communication to gain an advantage in litigation, court can find waiver for all other communications on same
subject matter); North Dakota v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1353 (D.N.D. 2014) (fairness required waiver
with respect to privileged opinions on same subject matter as voluntarily disclosed privileged opinion because
government used disclosed opinion to gain tactical litigation advantage).
71. See generally Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1605, 1633-1637
(1986).
72. See Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Kilpatrick, Townsend & Stockton LLP, 684 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that
fairness analysis applied to patent-holder’s intentional prelitigation disclosure of privileged attorney opinion letter to later
adversary not expressly covered by FRE 502(a)); North Dakota v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1346 (D.N.D.
2014) (adopting fairness test of subject matter waiver for all disclosures where plaintiffs alleged waiver through
government’s prelitigation public disclosures of privileged attorney opinion memoranda, as well as intentional disclosures
in discovery process).
73. United States v. Suarez, 820 F.2d 1158, 1160 (11th Cir. 1987) (attorney-client privilege waived when
defendant’s attorney testified at pretrial hearing to withdraw guilty plea; once attorney testified at hearing to
withdraw guilty plea, privilege “could not bar his testimony on the same subject at trial”), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
987.
74. See proposed-but-rejected FRE 512; URE 510 (1999).
75. United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792, 804-805 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing assertion of privilege with respect to
evidence improperly divulged by lawyer in breach of duty of confidentiality), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912; In re
Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 468, 470 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (upholding privilege to prevent
introduction of privileged matter at trial, despite fact that it had already been published in newspaper).

